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Abstract. Code voting was introduced by Chaum as a solution for us-
ing a possibly infected-by-malware device to cast a vote in an electronic
voting application. Chaum’s work on code voting assumed voting codes
are physically delivered to voters using the mail system, implicitly requir-
ing to trust the mail system. This is not necessarily a valid assumption to
make - especially if the mail system cannot be trusted. When conspiring
with the recipient of the cast ballots, privacy is broken.
It is clear to the public that when it comes to privacy, computers and
“secure” communication over the Internet cannot fully be trusted. This
emphasizes the importance of using: (1) Unconditional security for secure
network communication. (2) Reduce reliance on untrusted computers.
In this paper we explore how to remove the mail system trust assumption
in code voting. We use PSMT protocols (SCN 2012) where with the help
of visual aids, humans can carry out mod 10 addition correctly with
a 99% degree of accuracy. We introduce an unconditionally secure MIX
based on the combinatorics of set systems.
Given that end users of our proposed voting scheme construction are hu-
mans we cannot use classical Secure Multi Party Computation protocols.
Our solutions are for both single and multi-seat elections achieving:
i) An anonymous and perfectly secure communication network secure
against a t-bounded passive adversary used to deliver voting,
ii) The end step of the protocol can be handled by a human to evade
the threat of malware.
We do not focus on active adversaries.
Keywords:Voting Systems, Internet Voting, Information Theoretic Anonymity,
Private and Secure Message Transmission, Computer System Diversity.
1 Introduction
Electronic voting over the Internet enables to cast votes from an Internet-
connected device from any physical Internet accessible location compared
∗A part of this work was done while being, part time, at RCIS/AIST, Japan.
to booth based electronic voting systems developed by the cryptographic
community [10,22]. Internet voting does not require voters to be physically
present at a polling station.
Even though secure Internet voting is in its infancy, many countries
and organizations are considering adoption or have already done so such
as Estonia [33] and Switzerland [2]. In Estonia, participation increased by
17% [34]. Similarly, after IACR used the Helios Internet voting system [29]
which allowed its member’s who are based in different geographical loca-
tions to cast their secure vote online, voting increased from 20% to around
30%-40%.
Experts agree that achieving secure Internet voting will be even more
difficult than booth-based electronic voting [26]. For example, the 2003
CRA Grand Research Challenges Workshop on Information Security [1]
ranked secure Internet voting as one of the most challenging open prob-
lems in information security. These issues were put in the spotlight at the
2013 RSA Conference panel [40] and by Rivest in [37]. The difficulties lie
in the fact that computational devices are vulnerable to security attacks
and are easy to hack. Although SSL uses cryptography, modern browsers
are vulnerable to attacks such as click-jacking, cross-site scripting, and
man-in-the-browser attacks - as demonstrated against Helios 2.0 in [21].
Given that the computer of a voter can easily be hacked, in 2001
Chaum proposed a breakthrough solution called “code voting” [7] where
one can use a possibly hacked computer to perform a secure operation.
In code voting, a voter receives through the postal mail a long enough
unique code for every candidate. To vote, voters would just enter the code
corresponding to the candidate of their choice.
Chaum’s approach to code voting assumes the postal mail to be secure
from a reliability and privacy viewpoint. This is not a valid assumption
to make. Indeed, a collaboration of the postal service with the return-
ing officer4 may allow for the anonymity of all votes to be broken by
divulging the identity of voters to whom specific voting codes were deliv-
ered. Another problem 5 is that if one knows who is likely not to vote,
Chaum’s scheme is not very secure against ballot stuffing. Furthermore, if
malicious postmen do not deliver voting codes, this prevents voters from
casting their votes 5. If the election is tight and the number of undelivered
ballots is high, this could undermine the reliability and trustworthiness
of code voting through the postal service. So, one question we address is
how we can make Chaum’s code voting secure against t passive insiders.
4A returning officer oversees elections in one or more constituencies [44].
5Since we focus on a passive adversary, our paper does not address this attack.
Obviously we need to maintain the anonymity of voters. One way
to achieve anonymity is through the use of MIX-networks. These were
first introduced by Chaum in [8] and are used in electronic voting. MIX-
networks allow senders to input a number of (usually encrypted) mes-
sages to a MIX-network which then outputs and delivers each message
to all recipients without the receiver being able to identify the sender.
Various ways with which MIX-networks are constructed are described in
Section 2.1. The main issue with such constructions is that they are based
on tools based on computational assumptions which when used within the
context of an electronic voting scheme only allows for conditional security
thus conditional privacy and conditional anonymity to be achieved.
Note that no conditional secure cryptosystem designed so far has with-
stood cryptanalysis for more than 300 years. Quantum computers will
undermine computational voting schemes cryptographers have proposed,
in particular these based on ElGamal. For many goals, unconditionally
secure solutions have already been proposed, e.g., since 1988 [4,9] we have
unconditionally secure multiparty computation. This is a further motiva-
tion for proposing an unconditionally secure voting scheme in which t
insiders can be corrupted. Due to the revelations by Snowden [14], some
have questioned the security of the NIST standards [42]. So, one can won-
der whether we want to promote voting systems which might be broken,
if not now, then in the future. The importance of requiring unconditional
vote security is further highlighted with the following example:
In 2020 Alice turns 18 and votes using a popular ElGamal based
electronic voting scheme. 50 years later, Alice is a candidate for
president of the USA. Imagine that in 2070 USA politics is going
through a new McCarthy [41] witch hunt. Unfortunately for Alice,
ElGamal security has since been broken. The newspapers find that
Alice voted for the what is then considered the “wrong” party!
In this paper we focus on unconditional security proposing alternative
MIX constructions (using set systems and shares of messages), to gener-
ate the correctness of the vote unconditionally. To counter technological
threats and the possible influence of elections by foreign governments
(where hardware are manufactured), our proposed Internet code voting
solution uses the concept of diversity, first described in [23]. So, we employ
a diversity of computing systems to achieve security in our proposed solu-
tion. Using diversity of network paths we also ensure that any t-bounded
adversarial presence is unable to break the privacy of any votes. We con-
sider the t-bounded computationally unlimited adversary to be capable
of taking control of any node between the vote authority and the voters
which includes nodes in the MIX-network, nodes in the communication
network or voters computational devices (through malware). It should be
noted that we do not consider the human voters to be corruptible.
The main part of our work assumes a passive adversary which can only
observe but cannot cause deviation of protocol execution in any way. We
also assumes that the adversary cannot look at the information on the
whole network but only inside t nodes. Our solution considering an active
adversary will be presented in a future full version of this paper.
Considering a t-bounded adversary we emphasise the following:
Important Statement 1 As shown in [24], when the number of cor-
rupted nodes is at most t, the minimum number of disjoint paths to allow
for private communication between a sender and a receiver is t+ 1.
Corollary 1 Because of the above, voters will have to use a number of
computing devices to securely receive (or dually send) their voting codes.
The impact of Corollary 1 is not as bad as it might initially seem. Nowa-
days, many people in developed countries can have effortless access to
more than one device such as PC’s, laptops, smartphones and tablets.
Such devices can include those they own or can access through friends
and relatives or through public access (such as a library). Furthermore,
each of these devices can be connected to a communication network in
a different manner (Internet or cellular) which could be serviced by dif-
ferent providers. These devices may run different operating systems (e.g.
Windows, IoS, Android) thus a threat to one device may not necessarily
constitute a threat to another - even with the same user.
Similar to the work of [5,30] which considers security protocols as
used by humans who can execute them without relying on a fully trusted
computer we do the same in this paper in the context of Internet voting.
Motivated by all the above, we propose an unconditional Internet code
voting protocol which is secure against the possible presence of an adver-
sary and malware in the network and on voter’s devices respectively. We
present solutions for single seat and multi-seat elections both of which are
designed to be user friendly - so that human voters can use it correctly
with high accuracy6. In EVOTE2014 [36] the authors addressed a very
6It should be noted that the main goal of our work is Internet code-voting secure
against t insiders. The work of [6] is independent and their MIX servers are different
using a homomorphic, unconditionally hiding commitment scheme to encrypt audit
information and achieve unconditional security. Furthermore, their solution assumes
similar problem as our current work. However, their solution achieves
conditional security which could be broken in the future against a com-
putationally unlimited adversary. Furthermore, the authors consider the
adversary to be present in the MIX network only and do not take into
account the possible presence of malware upon the tablets with which
voters will use to cast their votes. Passive malware could possibly iden-
tify to an adversary how someone voted, whereas active malware could
alter the way someone votes - thus rigging the result of an election.
When combined with [20], one can view our proposed method for de-
livering codes to voters as a distributed implementation of a one-time-pad-
secured communication channel for votes. Because of this, our solution
can also be used for other established code voting schemes as it is a way
of removing the use of a possibly untrusted mail system and transmitting
the voting codes securely, reliably and anonymously to voters.
The text is organized as follows. Background and relevant previous
work are presented in Section 2. In Section 3 a high level description of
the protocol is given and we identify the required cryptographic tools. In
Section 4 we provide a simplified version of the MIX private and anony-
mous communication protocol. This is used in Section 5 in a more efficient
manner where we present private and anonymous communication proto-
cols for the transmission of voting codes to voters for single seat and
multi seat elections. In Section 6 the electronic code voting protocol is
presented and the security proof of the protocol is also given.
2 Background and Previous Work
2.1 Previous Work
This section describes previous work related to various aspects to be
presented in this paper.
MIX-networks can be constructed using a shuffle (permutation). One
way of achieving this [32,39] is by using approaches which are based on
zero-knowledge arguments [25,45]. In [17] the use of zero-knowledge was
avoided. MIX-networks based on zero-knowledge arguments can be used
the use of two mix-networks one of which is private and thus cannot be corrupted by
the adversary. Our solution does not make this assumption and instead counters the
threat of the adversary presence for protocol correctness accordingly. However, due to
the possible presence of malware the only way we know how to achieve this, is using
unconditionally secure techniques achieved through the use of cover designs. Addition-
ally we use results from previous work [20] which allows for humans to privately and
reliably receive and decode messages, something achieved with unconditional security.
in electronic voting protocols - as has been proposed in recent publica-
tions [27,28]. Earlier work [38] similarly used shuffles in electronic voting
based on zero-knowledge proofs. Other work on MIX-networks includes
the work of Abe in [3].
Such constructions are based on computational assumptions which
only allow for conditional security. The work we present is based on the
stronger model of unconditional security.
Anonymity in practice is difficult to achieve. One proposed implemen-
tation was that of [31] but it was shown to be insecure in [43].
A voting scheme similar to the one we propose which achieves infor-
mation theoretic security and requires the voter to carry out modular
addition is that presented in [35]. Contrary to the voting scheme pro-
posed in this paper, the work of [35] is not an Internet voting scheme as
it requires voters to cast their votes at a polling station.
The work of [13] describes an election scheme which requires compu-
tational modular exponentiation operations to be carried out by voters.
These operations require software or hardware. Furthermore, public key-
cryptography is used, meaning that the security properties achieved are
computational and not information theoretic - as achieved in our scheme.
2.2 Message Transmission Security Properties
Below we define message transmission security properties which will be re-
quired throughout the text. For formal definitions, see [19]. In our setting
we have a single receiver S connected tom number of senders (r1, · · · , rm)
over a possibly corrupt underlying network.
(Perfectly) Correct - When the receiver accepts a message, it was
sent by a sender S.
(Perfectly) Reliable - When a sender S transmits a message, this
message will be received by the receiver with probability 1.
(Perfectly) Private - Only the designated receiver(s) can read a
message transmitted by S. i.e., for any coalition of t parties, their proba-
bility of correctly determining a message is the same whether the coalition
is given their transmission view or not.
(Perfect) Security - Means perfect correctness, perfect reliability
and perfect privacy.
(Perfectly) Anonymous - Considering the single receiver wants to
receive m different messages over the network so that each of m num-
ber of senders transmitted one of these messages (and each message is
transmitted and received only once), perfect anonymity is achieved when
for any coalition of t parties, their probability of correctly determining
the sender of any message is the same whether the coalition observes
the transmission view or not. In the context of Internet voting, perfect
anonymity is achieved when the voting protocol used does not facilitate
any party involved in the voting process to correlate any cast vote to a
specific voter with greater probability than any other.
2.3 Existential Honesty
Some of our ideas use concepts of existential honesty, defined in [17] as:
“It is possible to divide the MIX servers into blocks, which guar-
antee that one block is free of dishonest MIX servers, assuming
the number of dishonest MIX servers is bounded by t.”
To achieve this, [17] defined and used the following (see also [20, Sec-
tion 2.3] for an extensive description of set systems and how these relate
to covering designs.):
Definition 1 ([12]). A set system is a pair (X,B), where X , {1,
2, . . . ,m} and B is a collection of blocks Bi ⊂ X with i = 1, 2, . . . , b.
Definition 2 ([17]). (X,B) is an (m, b, t)-verifiers set system if:
1. |X| = m,
2. |Bi| = t+ 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , b, and
3. for any subset F ⊂ X with |F | ≤ t, there exists a Bi ∈ B such that
F ∩Bi = ∅.
We assume that private channels connect MIX servers of correspond-
ing blocks (i.e. when for block Bk, MIX server MIXk,i needs to commu-
nicate with MIX server MIXk+1,j, where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ t+1 and k < b, then
there is a private channel). We also assume such channels between the
receiver and MIX1,i and similarly, between MIXb,i and the sender.
2.4 Human Perfectly Secure Message Transmission Protocols
Perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT) protocols where the sender
or receiver is a human were introduced in [20]. In such protocols it is as-
sumed that the human receiver does not have access to a trusted device
since these may be faulty and/or infected with malware. Because the re-
ceiver is a human, such protocols aim to achieve perfectly secure message
transmission (PSMT) in a computationally efficient and computationally
simple manner. It is also important that the amount of information and
operations the human receiver should process be kept to a minimum.
Addition mod 10 was used by humans in these protocols [20] to recon-
struct the secret message of the communication protocol from received
shares through addition mod10. The idea of using addition mod10 for
human computable functions was also used in [5] but within a different
security context. By regarding in [20] Z10(+) as a subgroup of S10 the
operation became very reliable for humans to perform. Experiments have
shown that given clear, correct and precise instructions, coupled with vi-
sual aids, allowed for the correct usage of these protocols by a very high
percentage of human participants.
2.5 Secure Multiparty Computation in Black-box Groups
Black box multiparty computation protocols against a passive adversary
for non-Abelian group have been presented in [11] and in [16] through
the use of a t-reliable n-coloring admissible planar graph. These papers
studied in particular the existence of secure n-party protocols to com-
pute the n-product function fG(x1, · · · , xn) := x1 · . . . · xn where each
participant is given the private input xi from some non-Abelian group G
where n ≥ 2t + 1. It was assumed that the parties are only allowed to
perform black-box operations in the finite group G, i.e., the group oper-
ation ((x, y) 7→ x · y), the group inversion (x 7→ x−1) and the uniformly
random group sampling (x ∈R G).
3 Secure Code Voting with Distributed Security
In this section we provide a high level description of the secure code voting
protocol we will present in this paper. We assume the reader is familiar
with Chaum’s code voting scheme [7].
3.1 High Level Description
We call Code Generation Entity (CGE) the entity in the code voting
protocol which is responsible for creating the codes with which voters
will cast their votes. These codes are unique and are sent to the voters so
that each of these codes is used only once for the whole election. For single
seat elections each voter receives as many codes as there are candidates.
For multi-seat elections each voter receives a single permutation - which is
a permutation of the alphabetical ordering of the candidates. After these
codes pass through a MIX network, they will be sent to voters using
perfectly secure message transmission, i.e. using secret sharing. Voters
will receive each share using a different device, identify the shares which
correspond to the candidate of their choice and reconstruct using human
computation this voting code. To cast their vote, voters will send this code
back to the CGE via the MIX servers, which perform inverse operations.
For each of the received cast codes, the CGE will identify the candidate
the code corresponds and will tally up the cast votes for each candidate.
Our protocol does not use the mail system for the delivery of voting
codes to voters, but instead these are sent by the CGE to voters over
a MIX network and using PSMT. Similarly, cast votes will be sent by
voters to the CGE over a network as explained in Section 6.3.
3.2 Required Cryptographic Tools
The process should not facilitate the CGE (and indeed any t other parties)
should not be able to identify that a specific voter (from the set of v voters)
cast a particular vote. Furthermore, a number of the underlying network
nodes may be corrupt. Even though secret sharing is used, any protocol
should ensure that voting codes are not learned by any t parties apart
from voters themselves, otherwise anonymity of votes could be broken.
Human perfectly secure message transmission protocols as presented
in [20] are employed. We rely on the feasibility tests performed which
confirm that humans can perform these basic operations. We use the
secret sharing scheme friendly to humans as presented in [20, Section 2.2]
which guarantees perfect privacy unconditionally. Except for the voters
computing the codes from the shares they receive, all other computations
are carried out by computers, of which no more than t of these are curious.
4 Transmit and Reply Protocol
In this section we present the first of the required primitives - a perfectly
private and perfectly anonymous network communication protocol. For
didactic purposes, the simplest form of our proposed protocol will be
presented - with more efficient constructions described later.
Suppose that we have a single receiver and v senders each of whom
needs to receive a secret one time pad so as to sender a secret back to the
receiver in an interactive anonymous way7.
7The dual problem is that instead of having v senders, we have v receivers and one
sender. Obviously a solution for the first provides a similar solution for the second.
We assume the passive adversary controls at most t MIX servers. As
in Chaum’s work [8] and most conditional MIX servers, each MIX server
is involved in one mixing in our protocol. t + 1 blocks of MIX servers
will be required - denoted as B1, . . . , Bt+1, with each block consisting of
t + 1 MIX servers and we use Bk = {MIXk,1, MIXk,2, . . . , MIXk,t+1}
to identify MIX servers of the kth block and call MIXk,1 “Bk’s leader”.
4.1 Protocol Main Idea
The receiver will share each of the v one-time pads to transmit into t+1
shares using XOR. Each (of the t+1) share will be given to a correspond-
ing MIX server (i.e. one of the t+ 1 servers) in the first block B1.
The shares of the ith one-time pad and those of the jth one-time pad
might be transposed and will also be altered. To guarantee shares of the
same pad stay together, the transpositions and alterations are chosen by
the block leader. After the last MIX operation, the final block of MIX
servers delivers the shares of the one time pad to the senders, with each
sender reconstructing the received and altered one-time pad sent by the
receiver. Each sender will then XOR the secret message to be sent to the
receiver with the received altered one-time pad and send the result to
the receiver over the MIX network. During this reverse transmission, the
inverse alterations will be applied by each block leader.
By XOR’ing the one time pad initially sent out by the receiver, the
secret message sent by each sender can be obtained by the receiver.
4.2 The MIX Communication Protocol - 1A: Receiver to
Sender Transmission
We now present the steps in the MIX communication protocol for the
transmission of the one-time pads from the receiver to the set of senders.
Protocol 1 Private and Anonymous Communication Protocol
Step 1 Let pi1i be the i
th one-time pad (where 1 ≤ i ≤ v). The receiver
shares each pi1i into t + 1 shares pi
1
i,j ∈ F2l using XOR (where
1 ≤ j ≤ t+1) and privately sends pi1i,j to the corresponding MIX
MIX1,j in block B1.
Step 2 The leader of B1 (we callMIX1,1) informs all others MIX servers
in B1 how they have to permute the i-index of all above pi
1
i,j. This
permutation is defined by ρ1 ∈R Sv.
Step 3 On the i indices all MIX servers in B1 apply the permutation ρ1.
So, pi1i,j := pi
1
ρ1(i),j
.
Step 4 The leader of B1 chooses t+1 random bit string modifiers ω
1
i,j ∈R
F2l and privately sends ω
1
i,j to parties in B1.
Step 5 For each (i, j) the t+ 1 values pi1i,j are regarded as shares of pi
1
i .
Similarly, the t+ 1 values ω1i,j are regarded as shares of ω
1
i .
The MIX server in B1 computes pi
2
ij = ω
1
ij+pi
1
ij . pi
2
i,j are regarded
as shares of pi2, the ρ1(i) permuted and modified one time pad.
Step 6 Steps 2-5 are repeated, incrementing by one the indices of B1
and B2 until the last block Bb is reached.
Step 7 Shares held by MIX-servers of block Bt+1 are denoted as φi,j .
MIXt+1,j ∈ Bt+1 then sends φi,j to the i
th sender.
4.3 The MIX Communication Protocol - 1B: Sender to
Receiver Transmission
Upon the end of the first phase, each sender reconstructs their respec-
tive altered one-time pad using XOR over all shares received. Using this
altered one-time pad, a sender encrypts their secret using XOR.
Senders then proceed to send their encrypted secret to the leader of
block Bt+1. These are then sent back to the receiver in much the same
way as transmitted from receiver to sender, only this time, data are sent
between leaders of MIX blocks, the inverse permutations will be applied
and all modifiers used will now have be invalidated. Thus the leaders
of each block of MIX servers will use the inverse permutations ρ−1b and
invalidation of modifiers −ωki (invalidating using XOR).
The data that are sent back to the receiver correspond to the en-
crypted message transmitted by senders, and by applying XOR to this
using the respective one-time pad, the secret message transmitted by
senders can be obtained.
It should be noted, that this anonymous and private communication
protocol can be used for various practical applications. One such exam-
ple is anonymous therapy sessions with extensions of the protocol also
allowing for anonymous feedback.
4.4 Security Proof
In this section we present the security proof for Protocol 1.
Theorem 1. Protocol 1 is a reliable, private and anonymous message
transmission protocol.
Proof. The protocol achieves perfect reliability due to the passive nature
of the adversary. Perfect privacy is achieved as each one-time pad or
encrypted message is “shared” over t + 1 shares. As each MIX server is
used only once and as the adversary can control at most t MIX servers,
secrecy of these transmitted data is retained. We now prove the perfect
anonymity of the protocol - for simplicity of the proof we assume that
there are only two messages (two one time pads).
As t+ 1 blocks of MIX servers are used and each MIX server is used
only once, there exists a block Bi - 1 ≤ i ≤ b, free from adversary con-
trolled MIX servers. Because of this, the adversary is unable to learn the
modifiers and permutation which are added and implemented respectively
to the shares of the messages.
Assuming the adversary is present in Bi+1 and absent from Bi, the
view of the adversary of a share for both messages can be one of the
following two possibilities: (ωi1+pi
i−1
1 , ω
i
2+pi
i−1
2 ), (ω
i
2+pi
i−1
2 , ω
i
1+pi
i−1
1 )
Obviously, the adversary cannot distinguish between the first and the
second possibility as the modifiers and permutation used in block Bi are
random and not learned by the adversary. Indeed, there exists an (ω′1, ω
′
2)
such that (ωi2+pi
i−1
2 , ω
i
1+pi
i−1
1 )=(ω
′
1+pi
i−1
1 , ω
′
2+pi
i−1
2 ). So, the adversary
cannot distinguish whether the messages have been interchanged or not.
Without loss of generality, the proof can be extended to any number
v of messages. 
5 Reducing the Number of MIX Servers
In this section we improve on the “Transmit and Reply Protocol” pre-
sented in Section 4 presenting a solution for the single seat election case
where an Abelian group is used.
Our solution uses Chaum’s code voting and considers a single receiver
(e.g., CGE) and v human voters who each need to receive voting codes
(one code per candidate) in a non-interactive anonymous way. We con-
sider the CGE as the receiver and the human voters as the senders of the
communication because at the end of the combined protocol, the human
voters will send back to the CGE the voting code which corresponds to
the candidate of their choice. We regard codes intended for the same re-
ceiver as a long string and the MIX servers MIX the strings (i.e. those
intended for different receivers).
A more efficient network of MIX servers is used as our solution is not
confined to using each MIX server only once, thus the total number of
MIX operations done is b. We denote the set of MIX servers by X and
assume we have an (X,B) set system, which is an (m, b, t)-verifiers set
system set system as defined in [17]. We let Bk = {MIXk,1, MIXk,2, . . . ,
MIXk,t+1} and call MIXk,1 “Bk’s leader”.
The main idea of the protocol is very similar to the communication
protocol of the previous section. This time, the receiver (e.g., CGE) will
share each of the v messages to transmit using an appropriate secret
sharing scheme (and not using XOR). In a similar fashion, messages are
permuted and altered as they are transmitted within the MIX network.
After the last MIX operation, the final block of MIX servers delivers the
shares of messages to the senders, with each sender reconstructing the se-
crets (voting codes) sent by the receiver. We will assume the transmission
of the shares of these secrets uses the human friendly method presented
in [20]. Similarly, since a code is only used once, it can be modified using
addition over a finite Abelian group. To be compatible with [20] one such
example is addition mod10 over the group used. Senders will then trans-
mit back to the receiver the voting code corresponding to their choice.
5.1 Virtual Directed Acyclic Graphs
When an Abelian group is used and when blocks of the (m, b, t)-verifiers
set system can share common MIX servers between them, we define the
construction of a virtual vertex-labeled Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG).
The set of vertices of the DAG is composed of parties participating in the
protocol (which is similar to Protocol 3), with the source of the graph
being the receiver of the protocol and the sink being a sender.
The directed edges of the DAG identify the transmission of messages
from one party to another amongst different levels in the DAG. We define
levels of the DAG as the receiver, a sender and the different blocks of MIX
servers used. Considering block Bi as a tuple (ordered set), when Bi is a
block where |Bi| = l and b ∈ Bi, at location k in this tuple, we say that
b is at position k. With the above definition, directed edges of the DAG
will occur (i) from the receiver to all bj in B1 (1 ≤ j ≤ l), (ii) from each
bj in block Bb to the sender, (iii) moreover, we have edges between nodes
in Bi and nodes in Bi+1. The following is required:
1. If a unique color was to be assigned to each party of the protocol,
based on the results of [18], the sender and receiver can privately
communicate, if when choosing any t colours and removing the ver-
tices of the DAG with those t colours the sender and receiver remain
connected - meaning that there still exists a directed path from the
sender to the receiver on the reduced DAG.
2. We require that if at level k the parties in Bk receive shares of pi
k
i , the
parties in Bk+1 (i.e., at level k+1) receive shares of pi
k+1
i =ω
k
i + pi
k
ρ(i).
Two methods can be used to achieve the above requirements. One uses
re-sharing - such as the redistribution scheme described in [15]. The other
uses a large set of MIX servers X to guarantee the following property.
Definition 3. We say that set X of MIX servers is under t-confinement
if all members of set T where |T | = t appear in at most t positions over
all blocks of MIX servers used and this for all T ⊆ X where |T | = t.
It is easy to see that the above satisfies the DAG requirements.
5.2 The MIX Protocol
In the case of Internet voting this is used as a pre-voting protocol for the
transmission of voting codes to voters and it is used to achieve anonymity
of voting codes. We assume S to be a finite Abelian group and denote
with v the number of senders, and thus the number of messages (sets
of voting codes) that need to be transmitted. In the following, we only
describe the required difference when compared to Protocol 1.
Protocol 2 Private and Anonymous Random Communication Protocol
Step 1 Let si be the i
th message (where 1 ≤ i ≤ v). The sender shares
each si by choosing l shares pi
1
i,j ∈R S (using an appropriate
secret sharing scheme over an Abelian group where 1 ≤ j ≤ l)
and privately sends pi1i,j to the corresponding party B1,j in B1.
– As an (m, b, t)-verifiers set system is used, l = t + 1 denotes
the number of shares.
Step 2 Same as in Protocol 1.
Step 3 Same as in Protocol 1.
Step 4 The leader of B1 chooses modifiers ω
1
i,j ∈R S and privately sends
ω1i,j to parties in B1.
Step 5 Similar as in Protocol 1. Only:
The MIX servers in B1 compute shares of pi
2
i = ω
1
i +pi
1
i , i.e. party
Pj ∈ Bi adds the modifiers it receives from the leader of Bi to
the share(s) it holds. The shares of the pi2i are denoted as pi
2
i,j.
Step 6 If the concept of t-confinement is not used, re-sharing of shares
pi2i,j is carried by out by parties in B1 using the redistribution
scheme described in [15]. That means that each party in B2 re-
ceives l = t+ 1 values, which they then compress.
Step 7 Steps 2-5 are repeated incrementing by one the indices of B1 and
B2 until the last block Bb is reached. For all iterations - except
when the last block Bb is reached, Step 6 is also repeated (except
if t-confinement is used).
Step 8 If t-confinement is not used, shares held by the MIX-servers of
block Bb are re-shared.
Step 9 Shares held by MIX-servers of block Bb are denoted as φi,j .
MIXb,j ∈ Bb then sends φi,j to the i
th voter using [20].
It should be noted, that as in [20], MIX servers will send shares to voters
using network disjoint paths, as the communication network cannot be
trusted with the adversary capable of listening to at most t of these paths.
The way voters cast their vote will be described in Section 6.
5.3 Security Proof
In this section we present the security proof for Protocol 2.
Corollary 2 Protocol 2 is a reliable, private and anonymous message
transmission protocol.
Proof. Formally, we have:
Perfect Reliability - This is the same as in Theorem 1.
Perfect Privacy - The protocol achieves perfect privacy as each message
is “shared” over l = t+1 shares. In the case of t-confinement, the view of
the adversary will consist of at most t shares. This number is one less that
the number required to reconstruct a secret and thus perfect privacy is
achieved. In the case of re-sharing, the re-sharing guarantees that shares
at level i are independent of those at level i+1 (note that the adversarial
parties are passive). The rest follows from [18] and through the use of
re-sharing or t-confinement. When using re-sharing we ensure that there
is no cut of t vertices (colors) that can disconnect the sender and the
receiver. This is because the resharing of shares makes certain that the
parties in block bi receive shares from t+ 1 parties in block bi−1. So, any
adversarial t parties in block bi−1 will not allow to cut the graph. It is easy
to see that the condition of [18] (i.e. no t parties are able to cut a graph)
is satisfied when using t-confinement thus allowing for secure solutions.
Perfect Anonymity - This is very similar to the anonymity proof of
Theorem 1. The only difference is that now where a lower number of
MIX servers are used, due to Property 3 from the definition of verifier set
systems, there exists a block bi - 1 ≤ i ≤ b, free from adversary controlled
MIX servers. Because of this, the adversary is unable to learn the modi-
fiers and permutation which are added and implemented respectively to
the shares of the messages. 
5.4 Use of non-Abelian Group - Multi-seat Election Case
When a non-Abelian group is used, the protocol is similar to that pre-
sented in Section 5.2. Due to the non-Abelian nature of the group, alter-
native additional techniques will have to be employed to manage the fact
that dealing with shares cannot be done locally (due to the multiplica-
tion) thus this needs to be shared and securely computed among many
parties using techniques presented in [16].
Suppose we have an election in which we have s seats in which every
voter can vote for up to s of the c candidates - where s ≤ c. To enable
blinding of the code, we give to each voter a secret permutation pi ∈ Sc,
where Sc is the symmetric group. For each favourite candidate i the voter
wants to vote for, pi(i) is transmitted to the returning officer.
Note that pi is not necessarily unique to the election, as opposed to
Chaum’s code voting. The protocol is organised to avoid that this cre-
ates a problem. In the case of Internet voting, the following protocol is
used as a pre-voting protocol, for the transmission of v number of voting
“codes” (i.e. permutations) to v number of voters and it is used to achieve
anonymity of voting codes. We assume S = Sc to be a finite non-Abelian
group.
It should be noted that the protocol to be presented is only useful
for the private and anonymous transmission of permutations with which
receivers can cast their vote.
Protocol 3 Private and Anonymous Random Communication Protocol
Step 1 Same as in Protocol 2 only now a non-Abelian group is used and
permutations are transmitted.
Step 2 The leader of B2 chooses modifiers ω
2
i,j ∈R S
l
c and privately sends
ω2i,j to parties in B2 such that the l values ω
2
i,j are regarded as
shares of ω2i .
8
8As shown in [16], to securely compute pi and ω where pi is chosen by one party and
ω by another, we need 2t + 1 parties where t parties are curious. To mimic as closely
Step 3 For each (i, j) the l values pi1i,j are regarded as shares of pi
1
i .
The MIX servers in X ′1,2 ⊆ X where |X
′
1,2| ≥ 2t + 1 and B1 ∪
B2 ⊆ X
′
1,2 compute shares of pi
2
i = ω
2
i ◦ pi
1
i using a black box
non-Abelian multiparty computation protocol9 (see Section 2.5).
This is done so that ω2i blinds pi
1
i . The shares of the product are
denoted as pi2i,j and are obtained by the parties
10 in B2.
Step 4 The leader of B2 informs all other MIX servers in B2 how they
have to permute the i-index of all shares they hold from the
above operations. This permutation is defined by ρ2 ∈R Sv. On
the i indices the MIX servers in B2 apply the permutation ρ2.
So, pi2i,j := pi
2
ρ2(i),j
.
Step 5 The above three steps are repeated by incrementing by one the
indices of B1 and B2 (thus Bk 6= Bk+1). After parties in Bk
permute the i indices of piki,j using ρk - where 2 ≤ k ≤ b− 1, the
leader of Bk+1 chooses modifiers ω
3
i,j ∈R S
l
c which are given to
parties in Bk, the black box non-Abelian multiparty computation
sub-protocol is executed by parties in X ′k,k+1 ⊆ X where Bk ∪
Bk+1 ⊆ X
′
k,k+1 |X
′
k,k+1| ≥ 2t + 1 and the process continues till
the final block of servers Bb is reached.
Step 6 After parties in Bb permute the i indices of pi
b
i,j using ρb, the
leader of B1 chooses modifiers ω
1
i,j ∈R S
l
c which are given to
parties in B1, the black box non-Abelian multiparty computation
sub-protocol is executed between parties in block Bb and B1 and
the output of which is held by parties in B1. MIX1,j ∈ B1 sends
the output it holds to the ith voter using [20].
It should be noted, that as in [20], MIX servers will send shares to voters
using network disjoint paths, as the communication network cannot be
trusted with the adversary capable of listening to at most t of these
paths. The way voters will use what they receive to cast their vote will
be described in Section 6.
We now present the security proof for Protocol 3.
as possible the working of [16], ω2i,j is chosen by the leader of B2 and not by the leader
of B1.
9Note that the MIX servers in B1 ∪B2 can also be a in X
′
1,2 where |X
′
1,2| ≥ 2t+1.
Additionally, the efficiency of black box non-Abelian multiparty computation protocols
is better when |X ′1,2| >> 2t + 1.
10Note that [16] allows to organise the computation such that the output, i.e. shares
of pi2i , are received by parties in B2.
Theorem 2. Provided Protocol 3 together with the appropriate black box
non-Abelian multiparty computation sub-protocol is used, then Protocol 3
is a reliable, private and anonymous random transmission protocol.
The proof of the above theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 1, but
relying on either [11,16].
6 Electronic Code Voting Protocol
In this section we outline how components of previous sections are com-
bined.
6.1 Preparation, Mixing and Transmission of Voting Codes
As described in Section 3.1 the CGE is responsible for creating the codes
with which voters will cast their votes. We first explain this for the single-
seat election.
Considering an election has c number of candidates and that there are
v number of voters, the CGE will create v random initial codes for each of
the c candidates. In total, c×v unique number of codes will be generated.
The CGE will then group these codes to form v number of c − tuples,
with each tuple containing a single code for each of the c candidates.
Each of these codes will then be transmitted as one-time pads to the
voters in the same way as described by Protocol 2. It should be noted
that Protocol 2 describes the transmission of only v codes as opposed to
c × v required by the voting protocol. To transmit all the voting codes,
c executions of Protocol 2 will be executed at the same time. These ex-
ecutions should not be independent between them but instead should use
the same permutations (ρ ∈R Sv in Step 2) and modifiers (ωi,j in Step 4)
used throughout all executions of the protocol, i.e. the same modifier is
used for all codes the same voters will receive and they remain bundled
together (i.e. by reusing ρ). These c executions can be carried out either
in parallel or sequentially, as long as each voter receives c voting codes.
In the case of multi-seat elections, each voter will receive a single
permutation over Sc - which is a permutation of the alphabetical ordering
of the candidates. Moreover, Protocol 3 will be used.
6.2 Receiving and Reconstructing Voting Codes
We first explain the single-seat case. Each voter will receive l = t+1 shares
for each voting code, receiving each one using a different computational
device. It should be noted that the ith share of each of the c voting codes
will be received upon the same computational device.
The voter can then identify the code which corresponds to the candi-
date of their choice. Once all pieces of each code are received, the code
corresponding to their choice can be reconstructed in a similar manner
as described in Section 2.4.
In the multi-seat election, instead of receiving a c-tuple, a single per-
mutation is received - which is a permutation of the alphabetical ordering
of the candidates. Similar to the single seat case, t+1 shares of this permu-
tation will be received by the voter who will reconstruct the permutation
as described in [20, Section 4.2, Section 4.3]. This will allow the voter to
identify the candidates of their choice. Supposing the voter wants to vote
for candidate c and candidate c′, the reconstruction of the permutation
will help the voter identify pi(c) and pi(c′) which correspond to the can-
didates of their choice. To cast their vote, voters will have to send back
to the CGE these pi(c) and pi(c′) values.
6.3 Transmission, Mixing and Counting of Cast Votes
We first explain this for the single-seat case. A voter identifies the code
corresponding to the candidate of their choice and sends this code back
to the CGE by transmitting this code to the leader of the last block of
MIX.
To transmit voter codes in the reverse direction (towards the CGE),
the leaders of each block of MIX servers will have to carry out the reserve
operations on the codes. Thus the inverse permutations (ρ−1b ) and modi-
fiers (−ωki ) are used. Once a code arrives to the CGE, it will identify the
candidate it corresponds to and the vote will be counted.
The multi-seat case is similar. Once a voter identifies one of the pi(c)
which corresponds to one of their chosen candidates, they will have to
send this pi(c) to the leader of the last block of MIX servers. Similar to
the single-seat case, the reserve operations on the codes will have to be
carried out Once a voter’s pi(c) arrives to the CGE, the CGE will apply
pi−1 and identify the candidate the voting corresponds to and the vote
will be counted.
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